Security and privacy

Privacy is enforced at the collector. The agent has no code paths for capturing file content, keystrokes, or screenshots. A tenant admin can export a current privacy receipt that discloses collection categories, the bounded PowerShell script-preview exception, retention, and sharing settings. The receipt is a tenant-level disclosure, not a per-alert evidence signature.

  • Content-minimizing
  • Tenant-isolated
  • Signed wire
  • No message content

What the agent does not collect

  • Keystrokes

    Insider-risk patterns show in behavior, not in typed content. Storing keystrokes creates legal liability without adding signal.

  • Screen content

    Screenshots capture everything an employee reads and writes. That data does not belong in an insider-risk product.

  • Document contents

    The agent reports bounded sensitive-extension inventory counts and removable-media write metadata. It never reports file payloads or a per-file read history. The agent has no content-scanner capability.

  • Email and chat bodies

    Communication content belongs to the people communicating. Insider-risk signal comes from patterns of access and movement, not from message content.

  • Browsing history

    Page-level browser history mixes work and personal activity, and employers should not ingest it by default. Network-layer signal is sufficient and proportional.

  • Microphone and camera

    Audio and video capture do not belong in a behavioral-risk platform. The agent has no code path that activates either device.

This refusal list is enforced in the agent itself. These capabilities are not toggles. No configuration, update, or operator role turns them on.

What the agent collects

Collection is deliberately minimized, with one documented script-text exception. The categories below are the minimum an insider-risk platform needs to see. Specifics are in the per-tenant privacy receipt.

  • Host activity

    Primarily process, authentication, file-system, and host-state metadata about activity on the device.

  • Login and access patterns

    When and how often privileged activity occurs, and through which observed process and command shapes, compared with available personal and peer history.

  • Network destinations

    Host-level connection counts, unique and new destination counts, and byte-rate deltas, plus bounded DNS metadata when configured. No packet or page content.

  • Persistence and integrity changes

    Changes that affect whether the host keeps behaving the same way over time. The agent records state, not content.

  • PowerShell script text

    When host Script Block Logging is enabled, up to 2 KB of executed script text is retained after best-effort secret redaction. This is the one explicit exception where content is collected.

Privacy receipt

Every tenant admin can export a privacy receipt for audit. It covers the trailing 30 days and shows exactly what your tenant's data contains: the categories of data Vedric processed (with counts), the categories Vedric explicitly did not collect, effective telemetry/deviation and cold-archive settings, current AI-egress and aggregate-baseline choices, and online versus enrolled agents. Its HMAC is a server integrity checksum with a key ID. It is not an independently customer-verifiable signature. An auditor can compare the receipt with separately exported audit and database records.

Security controls

  • Encryption

    • TLS-protected traffic in transit
    • AES-based encryption for at-rest secrets
    • OS-level credential vault on the endpoint
    • Asymmetric signing for browser session tokens
  • Authentication

    • Email + password + TOTP (mandatory for operator console)
    • SAML 2.0 SSO with per-tenant IdP configuration
    • JIT user provisioning and group → role mapping
    • Force-signout via SAML SLO and admin control
  • Tenant isolation

    • Tenant scoping enforced at the data access layer
    • Static and runtime tests exercise tenant-scoped route and query paths
    • Customer content stays tenant-scoped; thresholded global fallback uses derived aggregate statistics only
    • Postgres row-level security as a second, database-enforced barrier beneath the application layer
  • Audit trails

    • Three independent append-only logs
    • Database-level enforcement against UPDATE / DELETE on audit tables
    • Tenant-visible audit log + operator audit + retention-governed forensic trail
    • Covered privileged actions stamped with actor, time, and reason
  • Agent integrity

    • Every update signed with an offline Ed25519 key and bound to its version
    • Installer refuses any binary that fails signature verification
    • Auto-update verifies signature before swap; rollback on failure
    • Only the public verification key is compiled into shipped agents
  • Operational

    • Live system status at status.vedric.io
    • Tenant-configurable database retention for telemetry and deviations; platform cold-archive setting disclosed per receipt
    • Archive-before-delete cleanup fails safe when an archive write fails
    • Backup and restore posture must be verified for each production deployment
    • Production change-control with full audit history

Procurement documentation

The standard artifacts security teams need before an evaluation are available on request under NDA.

Security review package

Current control descriptions and known deployment requirements are available for evaluation. This page does not claim a completed independent penetration test or certification.

Request artifactsReply within one business day.