Vedric is an agent, a cloud, and an operator surface - connected by signed messages and tenant-isolated at every layer. Nothing collected is content. Nothing executed goes unlogged. Nothing written can be quietly undone.
Runs as a managed service under OS-sealed credentials. Collects behavioural signals from the host, identity, and network layers; the specific collector mix is not documented publicly. Content is never read, never stored, never shipped.
Baselines behavior per user and per peer group, correlates deviations into storylines, and runs triage against a strict budget. Every query is tenant-scoped. If the AI layer is unavailable, baseline detection keeps running.
Your analyst sees one alert per correlated storyline - not a flood of events. Every response action is admin-gated, requires a reason, flows as a signed command to the endpoint, and is recorded to an audit trail that cannot be quietly edited.
Runs as a managed service under OS-sealed credentials. Collects behavioural signals from the host, identity, and network layers; the specific collector mix is not documented publicly. Content is never read, never stored, never shipped.
Baselines behavior per user and per peer group, correlates deviations into storylines, and runs triage against a strict budget. Every query is tenant-scoped. If the AI layer is unavailable, baseline detection keeps running.
Your analyst sees one alert per correlated storyline - not a flood of events. Every response action is admin-gated, requires a reason, flows as a signed command to the endpoint, and is recorded to an audit trail that cannot be quietly edited.
The refusal list is enforced in the agent source code, not in policy. Content cannot be quietly added by changing a config; the product's collection surface is constrained by design.
Every tenant-scoped query is automatically filtered. The guarantee is tested on every build - if a new table would create a cross-tenant path, the build fails.
Agent binaries are signed with a key that never lives on the server. A cloud compromise alone cannot produce a valid update; the attacker would need offline key custody too.
Every audit surface refuses edits and deletes at the storage layer. An operator with direct data access cannot quietly remove an entry - the write itself is refused.
Triage runs inside a strict per-tenant budget and a fail-closed control layer. An operator kill-switch propagates across the platform quickly. Baseline behavioral detection continues regardless - the AI layer is useful, not load-bearing.
Every response action requires admin role, a written reason, and flows as a signed command. There is no path to an anonymous or unreviewed action anywhere in the product.